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Abstract
This paper investigates correlative attack for the massive MIMO uplink. Malicious users (MUs) send jamming data sequences
that are correlative to the data sequences of legitimate users (LUs) to a base station (BS). We consider the problem of channel
estimation and signal extraction in the presence of correlative attacks. The right singular matrix of received signal at the BS
is a function of the correlation between the legitimate and jamming data in large-scale antenna regime. As a result, correlative
attacks degrade the performance of traditional channel estimation methods that base on eigenvalue decomposition (EVD) of the
received signals. Then, we propose a signal extraction and channel estimation method to combat against correlative attacks. More
precisely, geometric arguments, such as convex hull of extracted signals, are utilized for providing signal extraction and channel
estimation criteria. For the optimization of these criteria, we develop an extractor which is able to capture convex hull of desired
signals from noisy signals. Based on the proposed extractor, we formulate two optimization problems, whose global minima are
solved to perform signal extraction and channel estimation. Experimental results show that when correlation coefficient is 0.6, the
proposed method outperforms the EVD-based method more than 5 dB in the sense of normalized mean square error (NMSE).
Index Terms
Malicious attack, uplink channel estimation, massive MIMO
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) is one of key technologies in fifth generation (5G) communication
which can achieve high speed and large capacity [1]. The advantage of massive MIMO depends on trustworthy channel state
information (CSI) [2]. Nevertheless, malicious users (MUs) may exist in the 5G networks and actively send interference for
disturbing channel estimation. As a result, trustworthy CSI cannot be obtained and then false CSI undermines the performance of
massive MIMO system. To obtain trustworthy CSI for massive MIMO system, it is important to investigate channel estimation
under malicious attack [3].
Many works have investigated channel estimation under malicious attack. They differ in the underlying assumptions regarding
the attack model. For instance, in [4]–[6], MUs do not know the pilot sequences (PSs) employed by legitimate users (LUs),
and have to send random PSs for disturbing channel estimation. To be more specific, in [4], single LU and a base station
(BS) share a secret PS that is unknown to another MU. The null space of the secret PS is then used for eliminating the LU’s
pilot signal received at the BS, while leaving the pilot signal of the MU. As a beneficial result, the channel of the MU is
estimated based on the remaining pilot signal. In [5], all LUs and MUs select random PSs from a well-known pilot codebook
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that consists of orthogonal PSs. The BS does not know the selected PSs. It projects its received pilot signal onto the pilot
codebook and estimates the selected PSs from its projection. With the estimation of the selected PSs, channel estimation is
achieved. In [6], all LUs and MUs send random symbols independently. The independence invokes independent component
analysis (ICA) method to be applied for channel separation, which finally leads to channel estimation. In a much similar way,
the authors of [7] propose a two-stage uplink training, assuming that the power of LUs are different during the two stages,
while the power of MUs are invariable in two stages. This assumption of different power facilitates channel estimation.
The above-mentioned methods are implemented during pilot phase, requiring some additional pilot signal protocols which
are unknown to the MUs. On the other hand, there are also some works estimating channels during data phase [8] [9].
More precisely, these works employ eigenvalue decomposition (EVD) to signals received though data phase. Based on the
resulting eigenspace, channels of LUs and MUs could be separated in probability as the number of antennas approaches to
infinity [8] [9]. With these separated channels, the transmission power gap between LUs and MUs are further used for channel
identification. We note that a key assumption enabling the EVD-based method is that the jamming and data sequences are
statistically independent.Without this assumption, the performance of EVD-based methods cannot be guaranteed.
In summary, existing works either require additional pilot protocol [4]–[7], or require independence between sequences of
the LUs and MUs [8] [9]. However, due to size or resource constraints at mobile users in the Internet-of-Things (IoT), the
additional pilot protocols may not be always available. Furthermore, the MUs may perform correlative attack by sending
jamming sequences that stochastically depend on data sequences of the LUs, which may undermine the performance of EVD-
based methods [8] [9]. MUs equipped with intelligent reflecting surfaces (IRSs) [10] may also perform correlative attack.
Against this background, in this paper, we consider to combat against correlative attack. We propose a channel estimation
and signal extraction method, while no additional pilot protocol is required. The main contributions of the paper are detailed
as follows.
1) Firstly, we analyze effect of correlative attack in Proposition 1. We obtain that the right singular matrix of received signal
at the BS is a function of the correlation between legitimate and jamming data sequences in large-scale antenna regime.
More precisely, in the result of EVD applying to the received signals, the eigenspace corresponding to the MUs and
LUs overlaps with each other. As a result, the interference cannot be eliminated by the eigenspace, which degrades the
performance of traditional EVD-based methods in the presence of correlative attacks.
2) Secondly, in order to combat against correlative attack, we use geometry argument for developing signal extraction and
channel estimation criteria. The employed geometry argument is robust to correlation attack, but sensitive to noise. For
optimization of the proposed criteria, we further propose an extractor in Proposition 2 that can distill geometry property
of desired signals from noisy observations. Based on the proposed extractor, we achieve signal extraction and channel
estimation in the presence of correlative attack by solving two optimization problems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the correlative attack model and its detriment are presented. In
Section III, we propose the signal extraction and channel estimation method in the presence of correlative attacks . Simulation
results are provided in Section IV and the conclusions are drawn in Section V.
Notation: Vectors are denoted by lower-case italics letters; matrices are denoted by upper-case italics letters. Superscripts
(·)T stand for the matrix transpose. We use tr(A) to denote the trace of matrix A. [·]m denotes the mth row of its input matrix
or vector. For random variable X , PX denotes the stochastic distribution of X , PX(x) = Pr(X = x). For random variables A
and B, PAB denotes the joint distribution of A and B.  denotes dot product. X a.s.−−→ Y denotes X converges to Y almost
surely, wherein X and Y denote generic random variables or bounded constant. ‖·‖2 denotes 2-norm.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In Fig. 1, we consider a system model including a BS equipped with M antennas, N single-antenna LUs and N MUs,
wherein each LU is attacked by a MU in the uplink, and each MU is equipped with a IRS, which includes W elements.
The uplink communication between the BS and the LUs takes place in two phases, namely the pilot and data phases. These
two phases include Lp and n instants, respectively. During the two phases, the MUs conduct correlative attack by sending
spoofed PSs and correlative interference simultaneously with the LUs to the BS. More precisely, during the pilot phase, the
IRSs of MUs reflect the PSs, during the data phases, the MUs reflect information data sequence with a random phase shift.
The correlative attack model and its detriment are detailed in following subsections.
A. Attack Model
For j = 1, 2, · · · , N , we assume that the jth LU is attacked by the jth MU during the pilot and data phases. In the pilot
phase, the jth LU transmit the PS xj ∈ C1×Lp is selected from a public pilot codebook X. We define a diagonal matrix
Φp = diag(1, · · · , 1), Φp ∈ CW×W , as the reflection-coefficients matrix of the IRS about jth MU, means the MUs transmit
the same PS with the LUs. Then the received signals Yp ∈ CM×Lp in the pilot phase can be respectively specified as
Yp =
√
Lp
N∑
j=1
(hjxj + Gj2Φpgj1xj) + Np =
√
Lp
N∑
j=1
(hjxj +
W∑
w=1
gjwxj) + Np, (1)
hj denotes the channel from the jth LU, hj ∈ CM×1. gj1 ,Gj2 denote the channels from the jth LU to the jth MU and the
channels from the jth MU to the BS, gj1 = [gj1(1), · · · , gj1(W )]T ∈ CW×1, gj1(w) ∈ C1×1. Gj2 = [gj2 [1], · · · , gj2 [W ]] ∈
CM×W , gj2 [w] ∈ CM×1. gjw = gj2 [w]gj1(w), denotes the cascaded channels of the wth element of IRS, gjw ∈ CM×1.
Np ∈ CM×Lp are Gaussian noise and each element follows CN (0, σ2).
Then in the data phase, the jth LU transmits aj ∈ C1×n. Due to the IRS of MU, the MU reflects W stream signal sequences.
We further define the diagonal matrix Φj(t) = diag(eiφj1 (t), · · · , eiφjW (t)), 1 ≤ t ≤ n, Φj(t) ∈ CT×T as the reflection-
coefficients matrix of the IRS, it is randomly set according to Pr{φjw(t) = 0} = pw, Pr{φjw(t) = pi} = 1− pw, 1 ≤ w ≤W .
Then the received signals y(t) ∈ CM×1 in the data phase can be respectively specified as
y(t) =
√
P
N∑
j=1
(hjaj(t) + Gj2Φj(t)gj1aj(t)) + N =
√
P
N∑
j=1
(hjaj(t) +
W∑
w=1
gjwbjw(t)) + n, 1 ≤ t ≤ n (2)
bjw(t) = aj(t)e
iφjw (t), (3)
bjw ∈ C1×n, aj(t), bjw(t) denote the tth element in aj , bjw . n ∈ CM×1 are Gaussian noise and each element follows CN (0, σ2).
P is the transmission power of each user.
Remark 1: The single MU refelects signal sequences after receiving the signal sequence of LU, includes W stream interference
signal sequences. One MU equipped W elements IRS are equal to two MUs and each MU equipped with W2 elements IRS.
Therefore, this attack model is also applicable to multiple MUs.
Due to the exists of IRS, the correlative attack occurs, we explain the reason as follows:
Firstly, we assume that aj is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence. According to (3), bjw is also a i.i.d.
sequence. There are random variables A and B having the same stochastic distribution as that of each element of aj and bjw ,
respectively. Let us use PA and PB to denote stochastic distributions of A and B, respectively. Aj and Bjw are the alphabets
of these two variables, a and b denote generic symbols of Aj and Bjw , respectively. Due to the influence of φjw in (3),
PA,B(a, b) 6= PA(a)PB(b), a ∈ Aj , b ∈ Bjw . (4)
(4) shows that aj(t), bjw(t) are correlative, we further denote the attack caused by IRS as correlative attack. For ease
of understanding, when BPSK modulation is used by the LUs, it is not hard to get PA(1) = PA(−1) = 12 , PB|A(1|1) =
PB|A(−1| − 1) = pw, PB|A(−1|1) = PB|A(1| − 1) = 1− pw. Therefore we have:
PA,B(1, 1) =
1
2
pw, PA(1)PB(1) =
1
4
. (5)
As indicated by (5), when pw 6= 12 , PA,B(1, 1) 6= PA(1)PB(1). We further find the correlation coefficient between aj and bjw
is given by 2pw − 1 in appendix A. It indicates that the MU could control the strength of correlative attack by adjusting its
reflection probability pw.
Remark 2: It is shown that the MUs do not need to know aj explicitly. Based on random reflection using IRSs, correlative
attack could be conducted. It is worth noting that IRS can be flexibly deployed in wireless networks [11], for achieving high
spectrum and energy efficiency [12]. Thus, IRSs have potential of being widely used by IoT for enhancing its coverage and
efficiency [13]. Nevertheless, to the authors’ best knowledge, it is sparse to investigate the detriment of IRSs employed by
MUs. The presented example illustrates that IRSs could be used for performing correlative attack. We also analyze its effect
in the following subsection.
B. Detriment of Correlative Attack
In the pilot phase, after receiving Yp, the BS may estimate channels of the LUs by projecting Yp onto X[
h˜1, · · · , h˜N
]
=
1√
Lpp
YpXH
= [h1, · · · ,hN ] +
[
g11 , · · · , g1W , · · · , gN1 · · · , gNW
]
+
1√
Lp
NpXH ,
(6)
where the second equality is relying on orthogonal property of X. This equation indicates that the pilot spoof attack makes the
channel estimation be the combination of legitimate and malicious channels. There is a large estimation error. It is difficult to
get trustworthy CSI only using Yp. We propose to use Y received during the data phase for channel estimation.
By summarizing all the n samples in a transmission block, the received signal in the data phase can be recast as:
Y = CS + N, (7)
where C = [H,G], S =
A
B
, H = [h1,h2, · · · ,hN ], G = [g11 , · · · , g1W , · · · , gN1 · · · , gNW ], A = √P [aT1 , aT2 , · · · aTN]T ,
B =
√
P
[
bT11 , · · · , bT1W , · · · , bTN1 , · · · , bTNW ,
]T
. Y ∈ CM×n, N ∈ CM×n are Gaussian noise and each element follows
CN (0, σ2).
Traditional methods apply EVD to 1MnYY
H . The resulting eigenspace is then used for jamming rejection when the jamming
and legitimate data sequences are independent, i.e., SS
H
n
a.s.−−→ IN+WN . However, under correlative attacks, due to (4), we have
SSH
n
a.s.−−→ Rs ∈ C(N+WN)×(N+WN), where Rs 6= IN+WN . We find that correlative attack undermines the performance of
EVD-based method using the received signal Y [8] [9].
Proposition 1. In large-scale antenna regime, the right singular matrix of 1MnYY
H is UY = 1√M [UW ,CR
− 12Us], where
UW ∈ CM×(M−N−WN) has orthogonal columns, and spans null space of [CR− 12Us], R ∈ C(N+WN)×(N+WN) is diagonal
matrix depending on C, Us ∈ C(N+WN)×(N+WN) is orthogonal matrix, Λ ∈ C(N+WN)×(N+WN) is diagonal matrix, they
are results of eigenvalue decomposition, i.e., R
1
2RsR
1
2 = UsΛU
H
s .
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Fig. 1. The system model including one BS equipped with M antenna and there are N group users, each group includes 1 LU and 1MU, each MU is
equipped with a IRS, which includes W elements. Through the pilot and data phases, the MUs reflect W stream pilot sequences and interference sequences
to the BS, respectively.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix B.
Remark 3: Notice that UY is determined by not only CR−
1
2 but also Us. Us hinges on the degree of correlation among
rows of S. In [8] [9], all data streams are independent, i.e., Us = I. Then UY is irrelevant to interference data. UY is thus
used for eliminating interference from MUs directly. However, in this paper, due to correlative attack, Us 6= I. Null space of
MUs cannot be found from UY, but subspace corresponding to MUs and LUs are united by UY. It indicats that the MUs could
manipulate UY directly by conducting correlative attack, which makes existing work no longer available [8] [9].
On the other hand, as shown in (7), the received signals, i.e., Y, are the mixture of S, wherein the mixing matrix C includes
all channel vectors, with the distortion of noise N, every element in N follows CN (0, σ2), N ∈ CM×n. This observation
motivates us to circumscribe our goal of channel estimation within the field of blind signal separation (BSS). Nevertheless,
due to the existence of attack, there is a correlation between aj and bk and the BS doesn’t know the statistical characteristics
of aj and bk. Traditional BSS techniques in [14], [15] are not applicable to the attack scenario that we consider in this paper.
In the next section, we propose a BSS technique that works well under correlative attack.
III. SIGNAL EXTRACTION AND CHANNEL ESTIMATION
Due to correlative attack, we consider to use geometric argument, which exhibits insensitive to the correlation. For instance,
the convex hull of uCS [14], where u is the normalized vector combination vector of CS, only depends on the alphabet of
uCS, regardless of correlation of S. For easy understanding, we illustrate convex hulls of sequences in Fig. 2. As proved by
[14], L (uCS) achieves its minimum when uCS includes only one data stream rather than the mixture of several streams, where
L (·) denotes the length of convex hull of its input sequence, namely convex perimeter. It indicates that the convex perimeter
could be used for signal extraction, which is also the basis of channel estimation. However, we note that the BS only gets the
noisy observation of CS, i.e., Y, rather than CS itself. The convex perimeter is very sensitive to noise. As illustrated in Fig.
2, the noise changes the convex hull significantly, and thus impacts the convex perimeter. We first give Proposition 2 which
indicates an extractor with capability of distilling alphabets from its noisy observation.
Proposition 2. For a discrete and n-length i.i.d. sequence V n, let us denote its alphabet as V . And there is another noise
sequence Wn, which is independent with V n. Then, from the V n + Wn, there exists an extractor F. By using the extractor,
i.e., F(V n +Wn), V can be extracted in probability as n approaches to infinity.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the constellation of QPSK sequence (dots) and QPSK and noise sequence (dots). Superimposed to constellation are the boundary and
vertex of its convex hull, the noise changes the convex hull significantly.
Proof. Proposition 2 is proved by proposing the extractor F in detail in Appendix C.
We use the extractor F to distill V from V n+Wn, since V n is a discrete sequence, the convex perimeter of V is equivalent
to that of V n. We thus have the following Corollary 1 based on Proposition 2.
Corollary 1. For a discrete and n-length i.i.d. sequence V n, and there is another noise sequence Wn, which is independent
with V n. L{F{V n +Wn}} → L{V n} in probability as n approaches to infinity.
In next subsections, we use F and L to extract signal and estimate channel.
A. Signal Extraction
Revisiting (7), Y is the superposition of CS and the noise N. Notice that signal extraction corresponds with the minimization
of convex perimeter of uCS [14]. Relying on our proposed extractor F to achieve the convex perimeter, we establish an
optimization problem subjective to the signal extraction vector, where u ∈ C1×M .
[uˆ] = arg {minL{F {uY}}}
s.t. ‖u‖2 = 1.
(8)
Since
uY = uCS + uN.
according to Corollary 1, L{F {uY}} → L{uCS} in probability as n approaches to infinity. According to [14], signal extraction
vector is achieved by minimizing L{F {uY}}. As the contrast function of (8) cuts down the impact of noise, problem (8) can
be solved by the traditional gradient descent method according to [14]. More details could be found in Algorithm 1.
The key feature of our work, that differs with [14], is that we employ F to cut down the impact of noise on the calculation
of convex perimeter. In [14], noiseless scenario is investigated, signal extraction vector is obtained by minimizing the convex
perimeter of directly uY [14]. In contrast, in our model, due to the existence of noise, we propose F to get the convex
perimeter of uCS. Simulations confirm that the proposed F enhances the extraction performance significantly in the presence
of correlation attack and noise.
Based on uˆ of (8), signal of one user (LU or MU) is extracted as
s = uˆY, (9)
where s ∈ C1×n. In next subsection, we estimate one channel corresponding to the extracted s.
B. Channel Estimation
Without loss of generalization, we use c ∈ CM×1, to denote the channel corresponding to the extracted s. For m = 1 · · ·M ,
we use [·]m to denote the mth row of its input matrix or vector, then, we re-write Y as
[Y]m = [R]m + [c]ms, (10)
where R is the remainder signal.
Both [R]m and [c]ms are noisy observation that include noise and discrete sequence. Thus, [Y]m is the noisy mixture of
two sequences corresponding to [R]m and [c]ms, respectively. On the other hand, L achieves its local minimum value when
its input is the alphabet of single signal rather than any mixture. Therefore, relying on F, c could be estimated by
[cˆ]m = arg {minL{F ([Y]m − c′s)}} , c′ ∈ C. (11)
To solve this problem, we also prove that the solution is in a finite and discrete set, which leads to optimum solution searching
the finite and discrete set.
Proposition 3. The optimum solution to (11) is included by a finite and discrete set Qm, Qm =
{
q | q = y−y′z−z′ , z 6= z′, y 6= y′,
y, y′ ∈ Ym, z, z′ ∈ Z}, where Ym = F {[Y]m},Z = F {s}.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix D.
The key feature of (11), that differs with [16], is the use of our proposed extractor F. F is used in contrast function of
(11), and in Proposition 3 for locating solution. Refer. [16] only considers noiseless scenario, which does not implement any
denoising measures.
Based on Proposition 3, we could estimate c as cˆ from (11). Then, with cˆ and extracted c, the contribution of s could be
removed from Y. After deduction of cˆs from Y, let us repeat the signal extraction and channel estimation until all channels
are estimated. All steps of signal extraction and channel estimation are presented by Algorithm 1 in whole.
More precisely, in Algorithm 1, steps 3∼12 solve the optimization problem (8) by the gradient descent method. The resulting
vector uˆ is then used for signal extraction in step 13. In steps 14∼19, optimization problem (11) is solved by searching the
discrete solution set given by Proposition 3. After both s and cˆ are obtained, we deduct cˆs from Y, and run signal extraction
and channel estimation iteratively.
C. Channel Identification
Note that the proposed signal extraction depends on the minimum of L{F {uY}}, where L{F {uY}} remains unchanged
when the angles of its input are rotated. On the other hand, optimization problem (8) just indicates that the extracted signal
belongs to one user, but it cannot determine which user corresponds to the extracted signal. Thus, order ambiguity also exists.
Such ambiguities widely exist in BSS-based works [14] [17]. In [17], the author assumes that the phase and order ambiguities
are resolved perfectly by outdated estimate result. Similar to [17], we assume perfect channel identification following the same
assumption of [17].
Algorithm 1: Signals Extraction And Channels Estimation
% i: the ith signal extraction and channel estimation;
% F: our proposed extractor given by Algorithm 2 in Appendix C;
% convhull: the function of getting the convex points of its input sequence;
% P: the function that finds uY(p1), uY(p2), uY(· · · ) and uY(pn′) nearest to y(k1), y(k2), y(· · · ) and y(kn′), respectively;
Input: Y, N , W ,M
Output: signals si and channels cˆi, for i = 1, 2, · · · , NL +NM
1 for i = 1 : 1 : N +WN do
2 Initialization: u(1) = 1, u(2 : M) = 0;
3 for iter=1:1:until L{F {uY}} minimum do
4 y = F(uY) % y is the alphabet of uY
5 [k1, k2, · · · , kn′ ] = convhull(<{y} ,={y})
6 L(y) = ∑n′i=2 ‖y(ki)− y(ki−1)‖2
7 [p1, p2, · · · , pn′ ] = P {[k1, k2, · · · , kn′ ]}
8 Wp =
∑n′
i=2 {Y (:, pi)− Y (:, pi−1)}{Y (:, pi)− Y (:, pi−1)}H/(‖y(ki)− y(ki−1)‖2)
9 g = ( 12Wpu− uL(y))/‖u‖2
10 µ = 1/(2‖g‖22)
11 u = (u− µg)/‖u− µg‖2
12 end
13 si = uˆY (9)
14 Zi = F(si)
15 for m = 1 : 1 : M do
16 Ym = F([Y]m)
17 Qm =
{
q | q = y−y′z−z′ , z 6= z′, y 6= y′, y, y′ ∈ Ym, z, z′ ∈ Zi
}
18 [cˆi]m = arg {minL{F([Y]m − c′si)}}, c′ ∈ Qm (8)
19 end
20 Y = Y − cˆisi
21 end
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
As the system model shown, there are N group users, each group includes one LU and one MU, each MU is equipped
with an IRS with W elements that can reflect W stream signal sequences, randomly. The channel is i.i.d. Rayleigh fading,
with a M × (N + WN) channel matrix. Without loss of generality, we consider a massive MIMO system with M = 128
antennas, and we consider different attack scenarios. N = 2, W = 2; N = 1 ,W = 3; N = 1, W = 1, in Figs. 3, 4 and 5,
respectively. The independent symbols of LUs drawn from a BPSK constellation, and we assume that the MUs conduct the
attack according to (3). When W = 1, we set Pr{φj1 = 0} = 0.8, then the correlation coefficient of aj and bj1 is 0.6. When
W = 2, we set Pr{φj1 = 0} = 0.6, Pr{φj2 = 0} = 0.7. Then the correlation coefficient of aj and bj1 is 0.2, aj and bj2 is
0.4, respectiely. When W = 3, we set Pr{φj1 = 0} = 0.6, Pr{φj2 = 0} = 0.7, Pr{φj3 = 0} = 0.8. Then the correlation
coefficient of aj and bj1 is 0.2, aj and bj2 is 0.4, aj and bj3 is 0.6, respectiely. The BS estimates channels, and achieves CSI.
According to the achieved CSI, BS uses zero forcing (ZF) detection to get the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) of
all users. The normalized mean square error (NMSE) of the channel estimation and the bit error rate (BER) of separation signal
are also selected as a performance metric. We simulate and compare the performance of our proposed method in this paper,
the bounded component analysis (BCA) method [14] and the eigenvalue decomposition (EVD)-based method [8]. Also, we
simulate the performance that achieved under perfect CSI. Since we consider multi-user, in order to evaluate the performance
of every user, we use the mean-SINR, min-SINR, max-NMSE, mean-NMSE and min-NMSE. The “mean”, “min” and “max”
represent the average, worst and best performance metric of all users.
Due to the EVD-based method depends on the transmission power gap between LUs and MUs in order to get the separability
of eigenspace, so we set the path-losses of MUs are less than LUs, that means the interference of MUs in our proposed method
is much stronger than that of EVD-based method. We use EVD-0.3 and EVD-0.5 denote the path-losses of MUs are 0.3 and
0.5, respectively.
In Figs. 3, 4 and 5, the path-losses of MUs in proposed method is 1. Although the strong interference of MUs in our
proposed method than EVD-based method, the proposed method has better performance than EVD-based method, and our
proposed method is close to that achieved by the perfect CSI. Specially, it is observed that in Figs. 3, 4 and 5, as the correlation
coefficient is fixed, the performance of the EVD-based method remains almost unchanged despite of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
increases. In contrast, in Fig 6, we consider N = 1,W = 1, the performance of EVD-based method changes significantly when
the correlation coefficient of aj and bj1 increases from 0 to 0.8. Fig 6 presents the performance of N = 1 and W = 1 under
varying correlation coefficient in the SNR of 16 dB. The proposed method has better performance than EVD-based method
in different correlation coefficient. It is consistent with the Proposition 1 indicating that in the presence of correlative attack,
the signals of LUs and MUs are no longer to lie in distinct eigenspace of the received signal matrix in the BS. Instead, the
subspace of the attack signals overlap with the eigenspace corresponding to the LUs, thus leading attack leakage when the
EVD-based method employs eigenvectors corresponding to the LUs for the received signal projection.
In our propose method, we consider to cut down the impact of noise and use the geometrical properties to overcome the
impact of correlative attack, the performance increases with the SNR increases in Figs. 3, 4 and 5, and unchanged in a
certain range with the correlation coefficient increases in Fig 6. Specially, in Fig. 6(a), it is observed that when the correlation
coefficient is 0.6, the SINR of proposed method outperforms EVD-based method more than 5 dB. The EVD-based method
has a better performance when the pass-losses of MUs are less that. It indicates that the stronger of attack signals, the worse
the performance is achieved by the EVD-based method. This observation could be explained by that the EVD-based method
attempts to eliminate attack signals as interference. The proposed method treats attack signals as that of regular users, rather
than interference. We also estimate attack signals and channels instead of eliminating it as interference. Thus, the proposed
method outperforms the EVD-based method under much stronger attack.
Next, in Figs. 3, 4 and 5, we also present the performance of BCA method, the performance of proposed method is much
better than BCA method. For instance, it is observed that in Fig. 3 the mean-SINR and min-SINR of our proposed method
outperforms BCA method more than 5 dB. The NMSE of proposed method outperforms BCA method, especially in low SNR.
In order to study the influence of signal correlation on the performance. In Fig. 6(a), it is observed that the mean-SINR
and min-SINR of our proposed method outperform BCA method more than 5 dB, respectively. And the NMSE of proposed
method outperforms BCA method. In Fig. 7(a), we get the BER performance of 2, 4 and 6 users in different SNR about
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Fig. 3. SINR (a) and NMSE (b) of the proposed method, the BCA method and the EVD-based method versus the SNR with N = 2, W = 2, the correlation
between signal sequence of LU and signal sequences of MU are fixed to 0.2 and 0.4, respectively.
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Fig. 4. SINR (a) and NMSE (b) of the proposed method, the BCA method and the EVD-based method versus the SNR with N = 1, W = 3, the correlation
between signal sequence of LU and signal sequences of MU are fixed to 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8, respectively.
proposed method and BCA method, in Fig. 7(b), we get the performance of 2 users in different coefficient efficient. The
proposed method outperforms the BCA method in any case.
We further discover that the performance will deteriorate with the correlation coefficient increases in both methods, especially
in BCA method. Actually, the BCA method works well in noiseless scenario. It indicates that the BCA method is sensitive
to noise. It is because that the BCA method is based on geometrical properties of desired signals. The existence of noise
changes the shape of convexhull of the desired signals. As a consequence, geometrical properties cannot be captured exactly
in the presence of the noise. Therefore, the existence of Gaussian noise damages the performance of the BCA method against
dependence attack. In contrast, the performance of our proposed method changes a little as correlation of users’ symbols
increases. Our proposed method considers to cut down the impact of noise as above mentioned, thus the correlation does not
degrade the performance of our proposed method significantly.
In summary, in the results of our simulation above, the proposed method outperforms the BCA method and the EVD-based
method in the sense of SINR, NMSE and BER.
V. CONCLUSION
Above all, we focus on the channel estimation under correlative attack with noise. We propose an extractor F that can distill
alphabets from a noisy signal. Then apply this extractor to the signal extraction and channel estimation. Numerical results show
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Fig. 5. SINR (a) and NMSE (b) of the proposed method, the BCA method and the EVD-based method versus the SNR with N = 1, W = 1, the correlation
between LU and MU is fixed to 0.6.
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Fig. 6. SINR (a) and NMSE (b) of the proposed method, the BCA method and the EVD-based method versus the correlation coefficient with N = 1, W = 1,
the SNR is fixed to 16 dB.
that the propose method has a better performance than BCA method and EVD-based method under the correlative attack in
a noisy environment.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
When BPSK modulation is used by the signal sequence a ∈ C1×n, it is not hard to get PA(1) = PA(−1) = 12 . PA denotes
the stochastic distribution of a. Due to the IRS, 1 ≤ t ≤ n,
b(t) = a(t)eiφ, (12)
where the φ denotes the reflection phase of the IRS. It is randomly set according to Pr{φ = 0} = p, Pr{φ = pi} = 1 − p.
a(t), b(t) denote the tth element in a, b. Then the transition probability PB|A(1|1) = PB|A(−1| − 1) = p, PB|A(−1|1) =
PB|A(1|−1) = 1− p. Then in b,
PB(1) = PA(1)PB|A(1|1) + PA(−1)PB|A(1|−1) (13)
=
1
2
p+
1
2
(1− p) = 1
2
.
PB(−1) = 1− PB(1) = 1
2
. (14)
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Fig. 7. The BER of proposed method and BCA method, (a) N = 2, W = 2; N = 1, W = 3 ; N = 1, W = 1. (b) N = 1, W = 1, the SNR is fixed to
16 dB.
PB denotes the stochastic distribution of b. The a and b are 0 as the n approaches to infinity, (·) denotes the mean value
of its input sequence. Then the correlation coefficient of a and b is
ρab =
∑n
t=1(a(t)− a)(b(t)− b)√∑n
t=1(a(t)− a)2
√∑n
t=1(b(t)− b)2
(15)
=
∑n
t=1 a(t)b(t)√∑n
t=1 a(t)2
√∑n
t=1 b(t)2
=
pn− (1− p)n
n
= 2p− 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
According to [ [18], Corollary 1], we obtain 1MH
HH a.s.−−→ 1MTr(RH), 1MGHG
a.s.−−→ 1MTr(RG), 1MGHH
a.s.−−→ 0, 1MHHG
a.s.−−→
0. Then we have 1MC
HC a.s.−−→ 1M
Tr(RH) 0
0 Tr(RG)
 = R. Then we have UHY UY a.s.−−→ IM . Because the distribution of S
is independent and identical, then SS
H
n
a.s.−−→ Rs. Then we decompose RY as
RY =
1
M
CRsCH +
σ2
M
IM (16)
=
1
M
CR−
1
2R
1
2RsR
1
2R−
1
2CH +
σ2
M
IM
a
=
1
M
CR−
1
2UsΛU
H
s R
− 12CH +
σ2
M
IM
a.s.−−→ 1
M
CR−
1
2UsΛU
H
s R
− 12CH +
σ2
M
UYU
H
Y
=
1
M
CR−
1
2UsΛU
H
s R
− 12CH +
σ2
M
UWU
H
W +
σ2
M
CR−
1
2UsU
H
s R
− 12CH
= UYdiag{σ2IM−N−WN ,Λ + σ2IN+WN}UHY .
As long as n is sufficient large, RY could be approached by 1MnYY
H . Wherein the convergence follows UYUHY
a.s.−−→ IM . This
equation (a) follows R
1
2RsR
1
2 = UsΛU
H
s
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Due to space limitation, we sketch the proof of Proposition 2 and give an algorithm for implementing Proposition 2. We
use Ln to denote V n+Wn. Note that Ln, V n, Wn are i.i.d. random sequences. Let us use V denote generic random variable
that has the same stochastic distribution as that of each element of V n. Similarly, we also use generic random variables W
and L following stochastic distributions identical to that of elements of Wn and Ln, respectively. Furthermore, note that Wn
and V n are independent with each other, as a consequence, W is independent on V . Since Ln = V n +Wn, we thus specify
L by L = V +W . Let FL, FV , and FW denote the distributions of L, V , and W , respectively. Then, because V and W are
independent with each other, we have
ΦFL(f) = ΦFV (f)ΦFW (f), (17)
where ΦF (f) denotes the characteristic function (CF) of the distribution F , and f is the frequency vector. Note that the noise
variance parameter σ2W is a characteristic of the receiver circuitry and can be measured a priori. We may assume that its value
is known, and thus ΦFW (f) = exp
{
−2σ2Wpi2 |f |2
}
is also known. Therefore, according to (17), FU is achieved by
FV = Φ
−1
 ΦFL (f)
exp
{
−2σ2W pi2 |f |2
}
 , (18)
where Φ−1 (·) denotes inverse CF of its input. It is worth noting that in (18), FV is obtained from L perfectly, even though
L includes noise W with arbitrary averaged power σ2W . Revisiting that V has discrete alphabet V , V could be achieved by
finding points v making FV (v) > 0. As a result, extractor given by (18) satisfies our goal of extracting alphabet from noisy
observation. However, in practical, the implement of (18) is challenged by two problems as follows.
1) Due to attack, FL is unknown. The lack of FL leads to inability of obtaining ΦFL(ω) exactly.
2) Φ (·) and Φ−1 (·) correspond to continuous Fourier transform (CFT) and inverse CFT, respectively. The transforms over
continuous domain may give rise to issues of implement.
Motivated by these two challenges, we propose an extractor according to (18) by using quantized empirical distribution of Ln
to approach FL according to the law of large number (LLN), and using discrete Fourier transform (DFT) and inverse DFT
to approach Φ (·) and Φ−1 (·), respectively. According to LLN and Nyquist sampling theorem, the approximation of ΦFL(f)
becomes more accurate as the quantization level and number of observations increase. In this sense, on the basis of (18),
Proposition 2 has been proved. Furthermore, we proceed to give an algorithm which implements (18) by sequential quadratic
programming (SQP) method. To be more precisely, notice that (18) is equivalent to
FV (v) = arg min
FˆV
∫∫ ∣∣∣ΦFL(f)− ΦFˆV (f)ΦFW (f)∣∣∣2 df , (19)
wherein FˆV is stochastic distribution function. To approximate ΦFL(f), we quantize L and achieve empirical distribution
ΠL̂n (n1, n2) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1 {<{Li} ∈ B (n1)} 1 {={Li} ∈ B (n2)} , (20)
where Li is the i-th variable of Ln, <{·} and ={·} denote the real and imaginary parts of its input, respectively. 1 {·} is
a indicator function. B (n1) = [−d1 + n14,−d1 + (n1 + 1)4], 4 = 2d1n1 , d1 =
√
n1. For f = [fr, fi], ΦFL(f) could be
approached by
ΦFL(f) =
∫
FL (l) exp
−i2pif
 < (l)
= (l)
 dl (21)
N,n→∞→ 42 exp {i2pi (fr + fi) d1}
×
N∑
n1=1
N∑
n2=1
ΠL̂n (n1, n2) exp {−i2pin14fr} exp {−i2pin24fi} .
Sampling ΦFL(f) across (k1f, k2f), k1, k2 = 1, . . . , Nf , f =
1
4Nf , we have
ΦFL(k1f, k2f)
N,n→∞→ Φ˜FL(k1f, k2f)
= 42 exp
{
i2pi
(
k1
4Nf +
k2
4Nf
)
d1
}
14
×
N∑
n1=1
N∑
n2=1
ΠL̂n (n1, n2) exp
{
−i2pin1k1
Nf
}
exp
{
−i2pin2k1
Nf
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[DFT{ΠL̂n}]k1,k2
,
where Φ˜FL(k1f, k2f) could be obtained from the DFT of ΠL̂n , denoted as DFT
{
ΠL̂n
}
. DFT
{
ΠL̂n
}
is a Nf ×Nf matrix,
whose (k1, k2)-th element corresponds to the value of DFT
{
ΠL̂n
}
in the (k1, k2)-th frequency. Hence, we approximate
ΦFL(f) by a Nf ×Nf matrix L, whose (k1, k2)-th element is specified by
[L]k1,k2 = 4
2 exp
{
i2pi
(
k1
4Nf +
k2
4Nf
)
d1
}[
DFT
{
ΠL̂n
}]
k1,k2
. (22)
Similarly, ΦFV (f) could be approximated by a Nf ×Nf matrix V, whose (k1, k2)-th element is specified by
[V]k1,k2 = 4
2 exp
{
i2pi
(
k1
4Nf +
k2
4Nf
)
d1
}[
DFT
{
ΠV̂ n
}]
k1,k2
. (23)
ΠV̂ n is the empirical distribution of quantized sequence of V
n, similar to ΠL̂n (20). Furthermore, accord to the definition of
DFT, we extend DFT
{
ΠV̂ n
}
by
DFT
{
ΠV̂ n
}
= FΠV̂ nF
T , (24)
where F ∈ CNf×N , [F]i,j = exp (−j2pi(i− 1)(j − 1)/Nf ), i = 1, · · · , N , j = 1, 2, · · · , Nf . Substituting (24) into (23), we
have
V = RV 
{
FΠV̂ nF
T
}
, (25)
where RV ∈ CNf×Nf , [RV ]k1,k2 = 42 exp
{
i2pi
(
k1
4Nf +
k2
4Nf
)
d1
}
, k1, k2 = 1, . . . , Nf .  denotes dot product. Notice that
ΦFL(f) and ΦFV (f) could be approximated by L and V, respectively. Based on (17), we have
L ≈ RW RV 
{
FΠV̂ nF
T
}
, (26)
where RW ∈ CNf×Nf samples ΦFW (f), [RW ]k1,k2 = exp
{−2σ2Wpi2 ∣∣k21 + k22∣∣ f2}. Then, (17) further indicates that (19)
could be transformed into a matrix form
F˜V = arg min
FˆV
∣∣∣L−RW RV  {FFˆV FT}∣∣∣2 , (27)
where FˆV ∈ CN×N , FˆV is the stochastic matrix to character distribution over complex domain. We SQP to solve (27). The
points making F˜V achieve local maxima are extracted as the estimation of V . As n, N , and Nf increase, (27) approximates (19)
more accurately. As a beneficial result, the extracted points from F˜V converges to the V in probability. We define the proposed
extractor as F, whose steps are summarized by Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2 could also be run several times for achieving result
congerence.
Algorithm 2: F: Extraction Alphabets From A Noisy Sequence Ln
1: Get ΠL̂n from L
n according to (20)
2: Get L according to (22)
3: Setup optimization problem (27) F˜V = arg min
FˆV
∣∣∣L−RW RV  {FFˆV FT}∣∣∣2
4: Invoking SQP method to solve (27)
5: Based on F˜V , find the local maximum points for extracting alphabet.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
We notice that the optimized signal extraction vector uˆ only extract the signal of one user, s. Further, estimate the
corresponding channel c. Then we re-write the Y as
Y = R + cs, (28)
where R is the remainder signal. More precisely, we choose the mth row of Y, where [·]m denotes the mth row of its input
matrix or vector.
[Y]m = [R]m + [c]ms. (29)
Since the noise exists, we use the extractor F to distill alphabets, then we get the alphabets of (29) as follows:
Ym = {y|y = γ + [c]mz, z ∈ Z, γ ∈ R} , (30)
where Ym = F {[Y]m}, Z = F {s}, and R = F {[R]m}. We discover that all of the different pairwise elements (y − y′) are
chosen from Ym must contain the element of [c]m(z− z′). Finally, we can get the finite set of [c]m as follows:
Qm =
{
q | q = y − y
′
z− z′ , z 6= z
′, y 6= y′, y, y′ ∈ Ym, z, z′ ∈ Z
}
. (31)
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